Military Civic Action (MCA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (H/CA), still popularly called "civic action" or "nationbuilding" by U.S. soldiers, are not normally topics that inflame our hearts and minds. 1 But they should. With "peace breaking out" in much of the world, and with shrinking U.S. military budgets, generic civic actions and humanitarian and civic assistance by U.S. military personnel ideally hold the promise of meaningful training opportunities and the utilization of force structure. Moreover, civic assistance projects can advance the interest of the United States in supporting I democracy throughout a Third World that is increasingly unable to pay for development commercially. These opportunities are opening at a time when civic action projects by the U.S. military are severely constrained by law and misunderstood by the public, both in the United States and in Latin America.
Cumulatively, the history of civic action, with its linkage to Counterinsurgency and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine, has tainted the idealistic qualities of the concept and has ultimately been counterproductive to fostering a future role for the Army in Latin America. 2 The removal of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) from Panama by the year 2000 offers a splendid opportunity for the U.S. Army to promote a joint service reorientation of U.S. doctrine and strategy, not only for Latin America but for most of the Third World as well. This reorientation effort should delink civic action and humanitarian and civic assistance activities from counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict. Furthermore, the Army should take the lead in establishing a new "U.S.
Development Corps" which would be structured to avoid the political and doctrinal pitfalls that have marked the history of the civic action concept. After an overview of how MCA and H/CA as U.S. policy tools for Latin America acquired negative connotations, the concept of the Development Corps is outlined at the end of this essay.
The Goals of Civic Action.
Discussion surrounding the political, social, economic, developmental and military goals of Military Civic Action as a U.S. policy tool for Latin America rose to the forefront in the J late 1950s and early 1960s. Therefore a majority of the literature and congressional hearings on Military Civic Action is centered on that period, from which we might glean some lessons.
In their pathbreaking study on MCA published in 1966, William F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning framed their discussion of U.S. MCA policy as a search for the resolution of the dilemma of security versus economic and social reform in Latin America. 3 Basing his dissertation on points made in the Barber and Ronning study, Robin Montgomery demonstrated that decisionmaking early in the Kennedy administration obscured any differences that might have existed between MCA as a developmental tool or preventative to insurgency, and MCA as a combat tool in military operations undertaken against an insurgency. 4 This differentiation of the role of MCA is extremely important in discussing the future utility of any type of civic action as a tool of U.S. policy as we enter the 1990s.
Even before President Kennedy definitively linked MCA to internal security and counterinsurgency, congressional debates showed that Congress voiced appreciation for the role civic action could play in development-as long as MCA was not linked overtly to "internal security" policies in Latin America. By 1957 the framework for future congressional debates on MCA and H/CA and their negative linkage with internal security doctrine in Latin America was being set. 5 Congressional discussion on aid to the U.S.-supported military regime in Guatemala in the aftermath of the 1954 overthrow of the Communist Arbenz government indicated that congressional interest in promoting developmental civic action by indigenous forces was linked to growing concern about Latin American economic conditions and their relationship to the possibilities of Communist expansion from within. 6 Until the threat of internal subversion rose to the fore, the U.S. rationale for military aid to Latin America was stated as the need for hemispheric defense against external aggression. 7 T'-e external aggression rationale was to be maintained sporadically into the Kennedy administration because it avoided criticism in Congress that U.S. aid to Latin American militaries was being used to suppress popular opposition within Latin American countries. 8 However, in line with Congress's more developmentoriented thinking, economic aid to Bolivia was quintupled by 1956, and quickly followed by the proffering of military aid. 9 Both types of aid promoted MCA programs by Bolivian troops that were deemed so successful by Senator Aiken in 1960 that he likened them to the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps and recommended that these efforts be encouraged elsewhere. 1 0 Ciic Action Linked to Counterinsurgency.
President Kennedy was responsible for organizing U.S. foreign affairs and national security agencies to guide and assist governments he considered threatened-most of Latin America-to resist the threat of Communist-inspired insurgency. "Cuba was in the forefront of the President's attention and was a symbol of the kind of troubles that would result from successful communist guerrilla movements" throughout the Western Hemisphere." The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) established by the President in 1962 provided the organizational framework for this effort and the doctrie of Military Civic Action.
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In an attempt to coordinate the economic assistance efforts of the Alliance for Progress with the military assistance efforts to counter insurgencies, the Special Group prescribed the necessity for Internal Defense and Development Plans to be drawn up for each threatened country. The prescription was A duly included in U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine and, in 1981, in Low Intensity Conflict doctrine. Military Civic Action, that "hybrid of economic and military assistance," 1 2 already linked in speeches by the President to the U.S. counterinsurgency effort, was a key concept of the prescription and thus became firmly fixed in both practice and doctrine to counterinsurgency. But when it was developed, the emphasis in counterinsurgency doctrine and training was almost exclusively on the military aspects of unconventional warfare. However, the promotion of the idea of MCA in Latin America remained an important tool of the Kennedy administration, at least "as a concomitant to internal security."' s Moreover, MCA as part of counterinsurgency initially received a large share of resources-and even more publicity. Presumably this was because it was considered an attractive concept with appeal to the public and thus a decorative embellishment of an armed forces public image.' 6
The Security Versus Democracy and Development Dilemma. There was no doubt by the mid-1970s that the Latin American military and security forces, with their institutional monopoly on power within the threatened countries, had been the most effective instrument against insurgency and urban guerrillas. 18 By the advent of the Carter administration in 1977, each of these countries except Venezuela and Colombia had come to be ruled by authoritarian military regimes which successfully eliminated the urban and rural opposition.
Congressional
The continuation of repressive measures by the military governments which dominated the Latin American scene in the 1970s prompted Congress to cut off all economic and military aid to these countries after 1974, breaking the conundrum created by the clash of U.S. interests in security versus the promotion of democracy and development in Latin America. The Human Rights Policy, presented in 1977, further assisted the United States out of the ethical bind created by the clash of these strategic objectives. Utilizing U.S. ideals and moral influence, the new strategy, hailed throughout the hemisphere, promoted democratic development in Latin America through a campaign to limit illegal abuses of the population by both repressive governments and guerrilla tactics.
prompted the Reagan administration to become involved in the region, and Central America gave impetus to a rebirth of interest in counterinsurgency and civic action. At the same time, the U.S. military introduced Low Intensity Conflict doctrine, which attempted to consider a broader view of Third World threats but continued to emphasize counterinsurgency and maintain the linkage between counterinsurgency and Military Civic Action. 19 Similar to President Kennedy exactly 20 years before, the Reagan administration became the organizing force which drove U.S. policy toward involvement in Central America as part of an activist ideological version of the Containment Policy which took a cold war view of Central American revolution. As in the 1960s, congressional support for military aid to Central American militaries was cautious. MCA as an item in the U.S. security assistance program for Latin America had long since been halted because of the human rights violations of many Latin American militaries and persistent congressional doubts about the political, social and economic benefits to be gained by enhancing the role of Latin American forces.
However, reminiscent of the Alliance for Progress, Congress approved a "total internal security" economic and military aid package for El Salvador, where the U.S. military attempted to promote MCA by the El Salvadoran Armed Forces according to traditional counterinsurgency doctrine developed in the 1960s. But opposition to administration policy on the part of the American public and Congress concerning the appropriate amount of U.S. involvement with the El Salvadoran military, and in Central America in general, limited the number of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador to 55.
Congress also cautiously supported the administration's Contra policy until it became apparent that the administration was overinvolved in implementing its anti-Sandinista agenda through the use of various executive branch agencies and departments without informing Congress. In view of recalcitrant congressional support, the Reagan administration made haste, as the Kennedy administration had done before j 6-it, to develop new venues through which to execute its Central American policy. One of these was the ad hoc development of "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance."
All of the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance legislation which forms the backbone of present H/CA policy and doctrine was originally formulated to support the U.S. effort to counter Communist-inspired insurgency and the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime in Central America. 20 One novelty of the Reagan program for Central America was the appointment of a DOD Director for Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. The new position was subsequently located in the Pentagon's Office for International Security Affairs which originated many of the ideas for H/CA as part of an active promotion of the Reagan Doctrine in Central America. Continued efforts to extend assistance to the Contras, sometimes under the rubric of H/CA, caused Congress to declare H/CA to "military or paramilitary" groups illegal. 21 At the same time, USSOUTHCOM in Panama implemented a "security development plan designed in part to renew emphasis on Humanitarian Assistance initiatives." 22 Traditional Military Civic Action programs, emphasizing the role of the local army, were to be subordinated to operations conducted directly by U.S. troops. This was apparently done very quickly. A General Accounting Office report created a stir in Congress when it revealed that Humanitarian and Civic Action activities were being conducted by USSOUTHCOM in Honduras without appropriate authority. 2 3
Congress, at the behest of the administration, legalized these H/CA activities performed by U.S. troops, but also severely restricted them. The Stevens Amendment, later expanded, permitted U.S. troops to perform civic actions-but only incidental to or in conjunction with approved military exercises overseas. This legislation has led to the persistent claim that National Guard and Reseve Component troops are in Central America because "we are there to train, nothing more." 24 Yet all of the Commanders-in-Chief of USSOUTHCOM have linked the military exercises to the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the Latin American "low intensity conflict environment." Moreover, H/CA activities, described as "a mechanism by which U.S. military personnel and assets assist Third World populations" by improving their "quality of life," have been linked within Low Intensity Conflict doctrine under "U.S. Military Support to Counterinsurgency."
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Other H/CA legislation promoted by the Reagan administration was also passed by Congress, yet always with caveats against U.S. military involvement in Central American counterinsurgency wars and warnings against using H/CA to veil covert activities. "I wouldn't prohibit military involvement (in H/CA activities)," commented a Democratic congressman, "but it's appropriate for Congress to begin thinking about developing with the Defense Department some kind of mechanism to make sure it doesn't become a problem and that the military doesn't use humanitarian assistance to fulfill its own agenda." Host nation politicians often share the U.S. Congress's suspicion of U.S. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance activities. Civic action projects by the U.S. military in Bolivia created a nationalistic uproar and considerable political opposition in 1989. First reported in Bolivia's largest circulation daily newspaper, 300 or so American troops were scheduled to extend the airport in Potosi, the capital of Bolivia's tin mining area. The Bolivian opposition to the project contended that "Washington's covert aim is to construct military bases in Bolivia--Civic Action projects, they say, are a way of winning popular support for an expanded military presence."27 Moreover, they claimed that the United States is attempting the "Hondurization" of Bolivia, to make it a base for U.S. military operations because of Bolivia's central location in the troubled South American "low intensity conflict environment."
A petition to bar U.S. troops from Bolivian soil was rejected by the Bolivian Congress; however the congress limited the 8 7.1 time that U.S. troops could spend on the airport project to three months a year. The troops, mostly Reserves and National Guard engineers with a permanent contingent from U.S. Southern Command in Panama, planned to bring in heavy equipment and return to finish the job next year. 28 The opposition to civic action activities by U.S. troops in Bolivia was exacerbated after the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. DEA Director promised during a visit to Bolivia that "the U.S. would only send troops to Bolivia at the request of the government." 29 The promise was publicized by the Bolivian press, but two weeks later "a campaigning Bolivian politician discovered U.S. soldiers handing out medicines in rural towns near the capital." Worse, "the soldiers' presence had not been publicly announced" and "the incident became an embarrassment for the (democratically elected) government when the Health Ministry acknowledged it did not know what medicines were being distributed. '30 With a long history of U.S. counterinsurgency and anti-drug operations in Bolivia, it is apparent that civic actions by U.S. troops are often perceived to be part of a hidden low intensity conflict agenda. Certainly suspicions about this linkage, harbored by many Bolivians, are counterproductive to U.S. interests in supporting democracy in that country.
Conclusions.
The problem of Military Civic Action is that the objective remains strategic--it's never just 'do-goodism.' 31 The Kennedy and Reagan administrations linked MCA, counterinsurgency, H/CA and low intensity conflict to internal security activities in Latin America that were often perceived by Congress to be antidemocratic and bordering on the covert, thus inviting severe legislative constraints. Presidential bulldozing of debatable policies through an alternately compliant and fearful Congress has resulted in questionable low intensity conflict strategies, or no strategy, for Latin America and contributed to lack of clarity in military doctrine. In addition, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress tacitly agreed in the late 1960s that U.S. promotion of MCA programs by Latin American militaries did not serve U.S. strategic or developmental objectives for Latin America. Instead the U.S. Department of Defense deliberately submitted minimum requests for MCA funds as Congress relatively increased appropriations and sales of security assistance to the Latin American militaries. 33 These actions constituted a de facto pre-Nixon doctrine decision to minimize U.S. active involvement in Latin America in favor of rendering strong security assistance support to Latin American military internal defense campaigns against insurgencies and guerrilla movements. The success of the "indigenous force/U.S. security assistance" policy precluded an active U.S. military role in Latin American counterinsurgency, and thus in MCA, which had become inextricably linked to U.S. Counter-insurgency doctrine.
The fact that the major policy decisions which preclude an active U.S. role in Latin American counterinsurgency were actually made over 20 years ago leads to the conclusion that MCA and the more recent H/CA will continue to have very little application in Latin America as long as they are linked to Counterinsurgency/Low Intensity Conflict doctrine. Furthermore, if those policy decisions precluding a U.S. military role in Latin American counterinsurgency were not substantially changed during periods of serious threats to stability, there is little likelihood that increased U.S. involvement of the traditional counterinsurgency type will prove to be an acceptable option for U.S. policymakers or for the majority of Latin American governments undergoing the process of institutionalizing democracy and building civilian prestige.
The phenomenal spread of the knowledge of human rights values, spurred by President Carter in Latin America, has created what I call a "Second Revolution of Rising Expectations." Whether or not democracy works in Latin America, there is widespread acceptance of democratic ideals among Latin American masses and an expectation that democracy must eventually work for them. A strong sense of nationalism, even if only rhetorical, is a concomitant of this process. Nondemocratic forms of government or at least nonelected governments are increasingly perceived as unacceptable. This political climate does not bode well for U.S. congressional or Latin American civilian receptivity to programs, even anti-drug programs, that promise to enhance the stature of the military, particularly if the programs are perceived to strengthen the military's nondemocratic internal security capabilities as outlined in LIC-Counterinsurgency doctrine, of which MCA and H/CA are a part.
There is no future as of now for MCA in Security Assistance. There is no groundswell support for LIC. 34 The inclusion of H/CA in a LIC-Counterinsurgency doctrine which is unlikely to become operational for U.S. forces severely circumscribes a future substantial role for U.S. military civic actions in Latin America. These conclusions lead to several specific policy recommendations on delinking H/CA from low intensity conflict. Remaining are questions about the relevance of U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine in the light of the increased ambiguity of non-Communist threats to U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere--and concern about the blanket application of the term "Low Intensity Conflict" to all of Latin America.
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With diminishing superpower competition in the Third World, the threat on which MCA, counterinsurgency, and LIC were based has receded, if, as President Bush has declared, we are "beyond Containment." 3 5 The Soviet Union has urged Cuba to stop exporting its brand of revolution; 36 the rest of the hemisphere is populated by "fragile" democracies that need economic rather than military assistance.
If the MCA concept was based on a threat that no longer exists, or is changing, throughout Latin America, the Army must devise new concepts. Economic, social and criminal threats are increasingly ambiguous as to the application of military power in a democratizing Latin America. The U.S. military should keep in mind that U.S. policymakers and the U.S. Congress have consistently found the developmental and humanitarian aspects of civic action activities to be attractive concepts above reproach. Moreover the humane aspects of these programs reflect American ideals which are well known and admired by Latin Americans and many other people in Third World countries. Therefore any civic action plan proposed by the Army for Latin America must emphasize humanitarian development and be completely divorced from "security," counterinsurgency, and LIC.
Recommendations.
How can a civic action program be set up for the future that will support the developmental ideals of the concept, utilize the manpower and resources of the Army, and avoid many of the political pitfalls that have plagued civic action in the past? The following recommendations and justifications for them offer an answer.
Delink humanitarian and civic assistance from LIC/counterinsurgency-include H/CA in a new separate "peacekeeping" doctrine. The LIC categories represent every kind of possible operation except major war in Europe. Studies done for the Army since 1983 have urged that discrete doctrine be formulated for each of the categories. But instead, the U.S. military should include the non-warfighting concept of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance under "peacekeeping operations" and separate them both from LIC.
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Broaden the new H/CA/Peacekeeping function-organize it as a specialty in each service-promote joint DoD projects.
The H/CA/Peacekeeping specialty would be dedicated to development construction and medical, managerial and conservation civic assistance. Its rationale is simply humanitarian; a form of cheaper foreign aid as U.S. foreign assistance budgets shrink. It should enhance Department of Defense "jointness," with all services contributing to projects. 38 Call the new H/CA/Peacekeeping function "The U.S. Development Corps"-establish the Development Corps as a new unified military command-contract its services only to democratic civilian governments.
The U.S. Development Corps would avoid the legal constraints that have marked the history of the civic action concept by working under contract only to democratic civilian governments. It would be stationed in the United States and provide its recruits with vocational training to fulfill its mission. Morale is expected to be high, as it has been in units that have performed civic assistance in Honduras. Service in the Development Corps might be an attractive option for U.S. troops coming home from Europe and Korea, providing opportunities for advancement based on excellence in civic assistance abilities.
Justifications.
The Development Corps supports U.S. national interests. Increasing the managerial and humanitarian competence of new democracies is an objective congruent with U.S. interests in support of democracy in a rapidly changing world.
The Development Corps is cost effective. This mission would help retain force structure and facilities in the United States and contribute to the alleviation of joblessness and lack of skills both in Latin America, through training and example, and in the United States, when those who have served in the Development Corps return to civilian life.
The U.S. Development Corps could prove, in terms of the U.S. budget, that the Army and other services involved in it are "paying their way." The institutional experience of the services makes the military the most capable organization for such a mission. Development work by the military is a form of foreign aid and therefore would save not only dollars paid to civilian contractors, but could realize additional cost savings by combining Army pay as foreign aid. USAID would negotiate the contracts in consultation with the Development Corps Commander. The work would also be cheaper for the receiving country. As USAID and Foreign Assistance resources diminish, the Development Corps can help fill the gaps. The U.S. Development Corps can serve as a multilateral development multiplier. Supporting the argument that developmental and economic assistance should not be tied to security,"the U.S. has progressively increased its contributions to the multilateral developmental banks and the United Nations system...." Such aid "now accounts for more than one-third of the total" of U.S. economic development aid. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. Most H/CA operations must be approved by the Department of ;;"." " St and funded from appoptations specifically set aside for " . . :;.' :--"-. , .: "
